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Abstract 
Although there has been a great deal of publicity surrounding the restriction of 
free speech  with regard to opposition parties in Singapore, in real terms, the 
value of free speech for such parties is limited. First, defamation laws in Singa-
pore require the opposition parties to exercise extreme caution to ensure political 
comments do not result in costly defamation suits or even imprisonment. Sec-
ond, free speech in itself is of limited use politically for opposition parties if the 
content of this speech is not disseminated widely by the local media. As a result, 
both the fear of legal suits and the limited dissemination of content continue 
to restrict the potential of free speech for opposition parties in Singapore. This 
means the contribution of free speech activities to inter-party debate is low in 
Singapore, thereby undermining the fundamental role of democracy premised 
on fair inter-party competition. 
Keywords: Singapore; Politics, Opposition Parties; Free Speech.
Introduction
There are more than 20 registered opposition political parties in Singa-
pore and a handful have consistently secured more than a quarter of 
the votes in the Singapore general elections since 1984 (Mutalib 2003). 
Some commentators believe that the opposition is also important in 
exercising a crucial 'checks and balances' role, theoretically curbing 
any authoritarian excesses that the ruling party might be tempted to 
introduce (The Sraits Times [hereafter ST], 29 November 1990). Although 
the opposition's role is described as weak in Singapore, its continued 
presence to some extent serves to 'legitimize' Singaporean democracy. 
However, very little academic work has been produced on opposition 
parties in Singapore. The most signiﬁcant body of work has focused 
on a review of general elections (Josey 1972; Mutalib 1992, 1993; Singh 
1992; Rodan 1996; Da Cunha 1997). Other analyses of general elections 
that discuss opposition parties have been presented as year-in-review 
studies (Lee 1985; Lew 1989; Vasil 1993; Koh and Ooi 2002). Another 
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body of work that incorporates a discussion of opposition parties fo-
cuses on the rules and regulations that govern the elections, in particular 
the history of constitutional amendments (Tremewan 1994; Thio 1997; 
Ooi 1998; Lam and Tan 1999; Tan 1999; Yeo 2002). To date, only one 
book exclusively devoted to opposition parties in Singapore has been 
published (Mutalib 2003), and this is still largely an analysis of various 
general elections and constitutional amendments. 
Although these writings are important and offer information about 
the challenges of the electoral process and constitutional matters, they 
do not present us with a full picture of the nature and performance 
of opposition parties in Singapore. An approach that examines other 
aspects of opposition parties, in addition to looking at election results, 
is needed to broaden our understanding of inter-party competition in 
Singapore. 
In the period before the People's Action Party (PAP) came to power, 
there was a freer political environment which was more conducive to the 
free-speech activities commonly associated with multi-party democra-
cies (Chia 2005). For the purposes of this paper, free-speech activities 
can be deﬁned as those attempts by opposition parties to directly com-
municate with voters and citizens.
The Singapore Constitution provides for free speech, but with restric-
tions. Clause (1)(a) of Article 14, declares that citizens of Singapore have 
the 'right to freedom of speech and expression': However, this right is 
subject to Clause (2) which states that Parliament may by law impose:
(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1) (a), such restrictions as it considers 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any 
part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality 
and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to 
provide against contempt of court defamation or incitement to any violence. 
(Constitution of the Republic of Singapore)
Singapore is unique in the sense that its Constitution's Article 14 
on rights begins by focusing on restrictions of freedom of expression 
– the right of freedom of expression is itself relegated to a secondary 
role. Therefore, in Singapore, the right to freedom of expression is not 
absolute, but can be curtailed by Parliament, which has the power to 
legislate restrictions on these freedoms. Therefore Parliament, and not 
the courts, dictates the extent of the freedoms guaranteed by the Con-
stitution (Hickling 1992: 186). 
Since 1959, the Singapore Parliament has been dominated by one po-
litical party – the PAP. Hence, in some ways, the PAP through its control 
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of Parliament dictates the extent of freedoms in Singapore, including 
the rules of inter-party competition. In fact, the rules of the game were 
changed to ensure the dominance of the PAP. Opposition parties cur-
rently operate in a restricted communications environment. The situation 
is one where electoral rules are constantly revised and tightened, political 
party fundraising is only allowed under strict conditions, constitutional 
innovations are undertaken to reduce the growth of opposition parties, 
the national trade union movement is afﬁliated with the ruling party, 
grassroots organizations are politically supervised, and the media is 
either directly controlled, intimidated, or practices self-censorship. This 
has led Freedom House to claim that Singaporeans 'cannot change their 
government democratically' (Freedom House 2005: 562).
In such a restricted environment, one method open to opposition 
parties is the use of direct verbal communication to get their message 
across to both small and large groups of people. However, the exist-
ence of several key pieces of legislation, which have been revised over 
the years, does have an impact on opposition parties' effective use of 
direct verbal communication. It is important to understand that such 
rules apply equally to all political parties, but in reality the opposition 
parties are most disadvantaged by these rules. Often there are excep-
tions for the ruling party in government; alternatively the ruling party 
uses all the communication tools at its disposal to control speech; this 
is an advantage that opposition parties do not enjoy.
When it comes to direct political communication, opposition parties 
have been denied permits to hold public events or to make political 
speeches; they have been charged with defamation of PAP ofﬁcials both 
during and outside of election periods; moreover they often risk arrest. 
Even when they are elected to parliament, their speaking time is limited 
and their speech is not protected. We shall see later in the paper, on two 
separate occasions, how opposition politicians were disciplined through 
the Committee of Privileges. This paper has chosen to focus on the im-
pact that three key pieces of legislation – the Public Entertainments and 
Meetings Act (2000), the Defamation Act (1957, 1997), and parliamentary 
privileges found in the Parliaments (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) 
Act (1962, 2000) – have had on opposition party communication. These 
are the laws that have been most frequently used to restrict the freedom 
of opposition parties' direct verbal communications.
Even though the free speech of opposition politicians is curtailed, 
such restrictions in themselves are not all that important. It is rather the 
impact on the content of free speech (tempered by the fear of defamation 
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suits), and the non-reportage or misrepresentation of opposition parties' 
free speech content, especially by the local media, that remain the more 
important issues. The barriers to the free dissemination of the content 
of political speech through the local mass media remain an important 
communications setback for opposition parties. Although the laws un-
der examination in this paper have been revised, this paper will show 
that nothing really has changed to substantially improve this situation. 
The reality of these restrictions and incidents convey the message to 
all citizens, and not just opposition politicians, that it is very difﬁcult 
to challenge or change the laws set down by the ruling PAP govern-
ment and that the ruling party is not above using the laws to suppress 
oppositional voices. The PAP does not acknowledge that free speech 
and freedom of expression are basic human rights, instead it promotes 
them as a privilege allowed only to the ruling party. In such a politi-
cal climate, how do the existing laws affect the free speech activities of 
opposition parties? If the free-speech environment is so restricted and 
opposition parties are unable to change the current laws, what options 
are available for opposition parties?
This paper pulls together the different strands of legislation and 
history of the free-speech repression of opposition parties, scattered 
across a variety of works, into a single and coherent focus. Apart from 
a preliminary analysis, the paper aims to provide a useful empirical 
reference point for future writings on Singapore politics by introducing 
free speech as a speciﬁc subtheme of research. In doing so, the paper 
seeks to add to the small but growing number of studies on opposition 
parties in Singapore and to contribute to a more textured understanding 
of the extant political environment.
The Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (PEMA) 
and Free Speech
The Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (PEMA) of 2000 is the 
most important legislation affecting free speech in Singapore1. The Act 
has its origins in an Ordinance dating back to 1958, with direct con-
sequences for political parties, especially those of the opposition. The 
current Act has been the result of several changes and amendments, 
but its key provisions have remained the same and restrict organized 
outdoor political communication activities by opposition parties. The 
Act governs the conduct of public events and meetings, requiring 
groups or organizations to apply to the police for a permit in order to 
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hold gatherings that are open to the public. In other words, the police 
must sanction all public gatherings in Singapore (South China Morning 
Post, 10 November 2002). 
The Public Entertainment Licensing Unit (PELU) is the government 
department, and part of the police force, tasked with administering the 
PEMA. Opposition parties have frequently complained about PELU 
and its licence approval process. Amongst their main complaints are: 
PELU's lack of transparency and the way it enforces the Act to 'violate 
the right to freedom of speech, assembly and association guaranteed 
by the Constitution' (ST, 18 November 2000); plus the lengthy and 
bureaucratic process necessary to obtain a licence (which can take up 
to three or four weeks, and several more to appeal against a rejection). 
Rejections have also been inconsistent, argued opposition MP Chiam 
See Tong from the Singapore Progressive Party (SPP) in Parliament in 
2000, where he raised the issue of his being denied the opportunity to 
speak during party-organized dinners in his ward. He noted that in the 
past, he had been able to obtain permits to speak in public at events 
run by his town council or his former party the Singapore Democratic 
Party (SDP) (ST, 18 November 2000). One writer had this to say about 
the public entertainment laws in Singapore:
The PAP continued to use the threat of 'mischief' to prevent political 
parties from holding rallies outside elections into the next millennium, 
making the Singapore Constitution's guarantee of freedom of assembly a 
provision honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Of course, 
the restrictions applied to the PAP as well as to the opposition parties – but 
again, the PAP hardly needed to hold rallies. It held power. (Lydgate 2003: 
105)
According to the law, opposition party MPs need to apply for licences 
each and every time they speak in public, even in their own wards, 
whereas MPs from the ruling PAP do not have this obligation. The Sin-
gapore police force explains the law as follows: 'All speeches require a 
public-entertainment licence, even when given by an MP in a community 
event. However, the Act exempts public entertainment provided by or 
under the auspices of the Government.' For example, PAP MPs do not 
require a permit when they are speaking in their capacity as advisors 
to the People's Association grassroots organization at organized events 
(ST, 18 November 2000). 
This inconsistency in the application of the Act was illustrated when 
the Workers' Party was ﬁned S$800 in 1986 after a constituency dinner 
and auction held as part of the Lunar Seventh Month celebrations, at 
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which the WP's then chief J. B. Jeyaretnam made a speech unrelated to 
the festivities. The PELU decreed that because his speech 'had nothing 
to do with the festivities, and was delivered in public, it needed a sepa-
rate licence from the dinner itself', and should be considered a separate 
entertainment item (ST, 18 November 2000). 
When opposition MPs do apply for a permit to speak at constitu-
ency functions, the applications are often rejected. Chiam See Tong of 
the Singapore Progressive Party (SPP) has also been refused permis-
sion to speak at dinners held by his party in his ward. For example, 
in 1999 he was denied a licence to make his prepared speech, and was 
only allowed to make a ten-minute thank-you speech. He handed out 
copies of his intended speech to the attendees (The West Australian, 22 
November 1999). He raised this issue in parliament twice in 2000, and 
was told by the Home Affairs Ministry that 'political meetings, with 
political speeches, are never permitted outdoors, because the speeches 
could turn inﬂammatory and lead to law-and-order problems' (ST, 18 
November 2000). This, however, was not always the case. In 1961, David 
Marshall, the elected Workers' Party Assemblyman of Anson, staged 
open rallies which he dubbed 'Report to the People' in his constituency 
to report to his constituents on parliamentary proceedings (Chan 2001: 
254-55). But since then things have changed. 
For the last several decades, the PAP has been able use this legislation 
to deny opposition parties the opportunity for direct, large-scale commu-
nication. Such restrictions affect both elected and non-elected opposition 
politicians. Over the years, opposition politicians have experienced a 
number of difﬁculties associated with the entertainment licence. Table 
1 shows how opposition party ﬁgures have been penalized under the 
Public Entertainments Act. Opposition leaders ﬁrst ran foul of the Act 
for simply breaching it, but thereafter the law was infringed deliberately, 
especially through the civil disobedience acts of Chee Soon Juan of the 
SDP. Opposition leaders' arguments in court that their political speeches 
and meetings did not constitute 'entertainment' led to amendments to 
the Act in 2000, and to its renaming as the Public Entertainments and 
Meetings Act (PEMA) with heavier ﬁnes. Table 2 illustrates the denial 
of permits to opposition leaders. Permits are required for events like 
outdoor political events, but they are seldom or never issued to opposi-
tion parties. The denial of permits has applied to three types of outdoor 
political events organized by the opposition – non-election rallies, din-
ners with political themes, and marches. 
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TABLE 1: Infringements of the PEMA by Opposition Parties
Name Party Date of 
offence
Activity Sanction
J. B.  Jeyaretnam WP 1986 Lunar Seventh Month 
dinner in own ward
Fine of S$800
J. B. Jeyaretnam WP 30 
May 1987
Civil disobedience 
protest against arrests 
of 22 professionals 
accused of a 'Marxist 
conspiracy' against the 
government
Charged with attempting to hold an assembly with-
out a police permit and obstructing the police.
Chee Soon Juan SDP 29  
December 
1998 
Speech in open space 
(Rafﬂes Place)
Fine of S$1,400
Chee Soon Juan 
and 
Wong Hong Toy
SDP 5 
January 
1999
Speech in open space 
(Rafﬂes Place)
12 days' jail for both men after refusal to pay ﬁnes 
amounting to S$2,500 for Chee and S$2,400 for 
Wong. The amount of the ﬁnes was later retroac-
tively reduced to S$1,900 each to enable both men 
to run for the next parliamentary elections.
Chee Soon Juan SDP 15 
February 
2002
Speech at Speakers' 
Corner
Fine of S$3,000 and barred from contesting in 
elections for the next ﬁve years from the time of 
conviction. 
Chee Soon Juan 
and
Gandhi 
Ambalam
SDP 1 
May 
2002
May Day rally in front 
of presidential palace 
Jail for 5 weeks for Chee after he refused pay 
ﬁnes of S$4,500, and disqualiﬁed from contesting 
in elections for the next ﬁve years from the time 
of conviction.  Ambalam spend one night in jail 
and was released after he paid the ﬁne of S$3,000 
the next day.
Sources: Agence France Presse (2002) 'Dr Chee Challenges Police to Charge Him over Speech', 4 March; 
Agence France Presse (2002) 'Opposition Rally No Threat to Law and Order': defence lawyer, 1 Oc-
tober; Lloyd-Smith, Jake (2002) 'Singapore Activist Deﬁant after Jail Term', 10 November; Lydgate, 
Chris (2003) Lee's Law: How Singapore Crushes Dissent, Scribe Publications, Australia; South China 
Morning Post (1999) 'Chee Heads to Jail for Unauthorised Public Speech', 2 February; Reuters (1999) 
'Chee Released from Jail, Will Fight On', 6 March; Reuters (1999) 'Chee's Fine Reduced, Can Now 
Run for Ofﬁce', 25 May; Reuters (2002) 'Fined Politician Loses Chance to Stand in Poll', 30 July.
Changes and amendments to the Act came about when a series 
of civil disobedience activities were undertaken by the Singapore 
Democratic Party secretary-general Chee Soon Juan to highlight the 
unconstitutional nature of the Public Entertainments Act. Two of these 
acts took place at Rafﬂes Place. The ﬁrst one was on 29 December 1998, 
when Chee was duly charged with giving a talk without a licence. J. B. 
Jeyaretnam, who represented Chee in court for the 29 December 1998 
incident, wrote to the president in January 1999, arguing that Chee's 
talk was not public entertainment in the popular meaning of the word 
'entertainment'. He also asserted that the Act 'violated Dr Chee's rights 
as a citizen, as well as the constitutional right of every citizen of Singa-
pore to freedom of information and assembly', and he further argued it 
was a very appropriate case to be referred to a constitutional tribunal 
(ST, 30 January 1999). 
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Nonetheless, his arguments were not accepted, and Chee stood trial 
in court. There, he said his constitutional right to free speech was 'vio-
lated by the requirement for public speaking permits', and Jeyaretnam 
told the court that Chee's offence 'fell outside the scope of the Act and 
constitutional violation voided the charge'. The judge however said 
he was 'powerless' to deal with the issue because he did not have the 
'power of judicial review' when it came to constitutional matters (Reu-
ters, 1 February 1999). The judge subsequently rejected Chee's argument 
that the law was unconstitutional, and Chee opted to spend seven days 
in jail rather than pay the ﬁne of S$1,400 (South China Morning Post, 2 
February 1999).
In March, Chee was put on trial for again violating the Act by mak-
ing a speech on 5 January 1999, again at Rafﬂes Place (Chee Soon Juan, 
5 January 1999). He was found guilty of breaking the public speaking 
laws and was ﬁned S$2,500. Again he refused to pay the ﬁne and opted 
for 12 days' jail instead. In addition, SDP ofﬁcial Wong Hong Toy was 
found guilty of assisting Chee and was ﬁned S$2,400. Both appealed 
against the convictions and made a request for a British Queen's Coun-
sel, a senior lawyer, to argue their cases before Singapore's High Court 
(Reuters, 6 March 1999). These cases made international news and became 
the advocacy focus for many international free speech organizations.
Chee had more run-ins with the authorities after he publicly stated 
that police had refused him permission to hold two public rallies in 
late 1999. He accused them of 'discrimination and violating the right 
to free speech after refusing his application to hold rallies' in August. 
According to the head of the police licensing division in a letter to 
Chee, the application was rejected because the venues were outdoors 
and there was 'a potential for trouble' and public 'inconvenience'. In a 
letter to the Home Affairs Ministry, Chee said ofﬁcials and MPs from 
the ruling PAP 'routinely give political speeches in outdoor areas', and 
asked 'Why should the law not treat all parties equally?' (Agence France 
Presse, 5 August 1999).  
As a result of these highly publicized disputes and civil disobedi-
ence acts against the licensing regime, a government concession to 
free speech was made when it established a Speakers' Corner in Sep-
tember 2000 (Reuters, 28 February 2001). This came about because The 
Roundtable, a political discussion group, suggested through a series of 
exchanges in the press the setting-up of free-speech venues. Although 
then-prime minister Goh Chok Tong was initially not ready for this 
development because he was worried about managing unbridled free 
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speech in such a venue, it was eventually set up (Financial Times, 27 
March 1999). However this venue is governed by strict rules: Speakers 
must register to get prior approval at the police station next to the park, 
and their speeches are recorded by the government and kept for six 
years. In addition, speeches may be subsequently used in defamation 
and criminal proceedings in courts of law. Other restrictions include 
the banning of certain topics dealing with matters such as race and 
religion (see Gomez 2002). 
Shortly after the Speakers' Corner was introduced, the Public En-
tertainments Act of 1973 was amended to include the term 'meetings' 
and become the Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (PEMA) in 
late 2000 (ST, 14 November 2000). The ﬁnes for holding public talks or 
delivering political speeches without a police permit were doubled from 
S$5,000 to S$10,000. Singapore People's Party (SPP) Secretary-General 
Chiam See Tong stated that 'As far as the law is concerned, it is against 
the opposition and nothing has changed'. Opposition MPs said the 
new law remained restrictive, in that it allowed them to hold public 
events in their constituencies without a permit but not to give speeches 
(Reuters, 28 February 2001). No change regarding this issue has since 
been ofﬁcially announced, but opposition MPs can speak outdoors at a 
constituency event provided it is organized by the Town Council2 but 
not by the MPs' political party.3 Further, at political events organized 
by political parties, such as anniversaries of political parties, the only 
type of speeches allowed are those kept succinct and limited to seasonal 
greetings and best wishes.4
In March 2001, a number of individuals from the Think Centre5 ap-
plied to hold a rally in a stadium, in support of J. B. Jeyaretnam, who 
was in danger of becoming bankrupt and losing his seat in Parliament. 
The application for the permit was rejected by the police on the grounds 
of potential law-and-order problems, including the stipulation that the 
Think Centre would be required to raise its own 'signiﬁcant resources 
to manage the crowd' (Think Centre, 26 March 2001). A subsequent 
appeal to the Ministry of Home Affairs was also rejected, again citing 
'law-and-order problems' and a clariﬁcation that it was not permitted for 
individuals to ﬁle requests. The organizers then decided to ﬁle another 
application under the name of an organization, which the Ministry 
agreed to consider (Agence France Presse, 29 March 2001). This applica-
tion was accepted and the 'Save JBJ Rally' was ﬁnally held in late April 
2001, under the auspices of local non-governmental organization Think 
Centre ('Jeyaretnam targets next election', 3 May 2001). 
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Other kinds of permits were also required for the selling of Jeyaret-
nam's books and for displaying banners at the rally. The organizers had 
to apply for a permit at the Hawkers' Department to sell books, t-shirts 
and stickers (Think Centre, 19 April 2001), and eventually received an 
exemption for it. Another layer of bureaucracy involved getting permis-
sion for some banners to be approved for use at the stadium that was the 
venue of the rally. This was granted after the Singapore Sports Council 
— which managed the stadiums — endorsed the banners in accordance 
with the rules set by the Building and Construction Authority (Think 
Centre, 22 April 2001). 
The changes in the Act did not result in any signiﬁcant increase in 
support or facilitation of free speech for opposition parties. In August 
2001, the Singapore Democrat Party applied for a permit to hold an 
outdoors National Day rally. It was granted after some delay, but the 
police stipulated that the party would need to hire a speciﬁed number 
of security guards at its own cost (ST, 15 August 2001). Another example 
was when Chee and SDP ofﬁcial Gandhi Ambalam were arrested after 
they tried to hold a May Day rally in front of the presidential palace 
in 2002 without the necessary permit from the PEMA. During the trial, 
a lawyer for the defence argued that the 'crowd' which was presented 
by the prosecution as a potential law-and-order problem was actually 
made up of journalists (Agence France Presse, 1 October 2002). However, 
they were found guilty and jailed in October 2002. Chee was jailed after 
refusing to pay ﬁnes totalling S$4,500: this was broken down as S$4,000 
for breaching the Act, and S$500 for 'wilful trespass'. Ambalam was 
ﬁned S$3,000 for the lack of a permit and for 'disorderly behaviour'. 
The authorities had denied the SDP permission to hold a rally, but Chee 
and Ambalam tried to carry on with it and both were arrested. Chee 
was jailed for ﬁve weeks after refusing to pay the ﬁnes, and Ambalam 
served one night in prison before settling his ﬁnes the next day (South 
China Morning Post, 10 November 2002). 
In 2002, Chee Soon Juan, secretary-general of the Singapore Demo-
cratic Party, spoke at the Speakers' Corner urging Singaporeans 'of 
different races and religions to tolerate each other's views and boost 
religious harmony and social cohesion'. Even though he maintained 
that he was not breaching the 'no religion and disharmony' rules (ST, 27 
July 2002), he also spoke on the 'tudung issue', a controversy regarding 
the barring of three Muslim girls from state schools after they had worn 
headscarves – or 'tudungs' – to class. Chee, in his defence, argued that 
his speech was neither religious nor aimed to 'cause enmity, hatred, 
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hostility and ill-will about any racial or religious group', and that he 
was within his right to speak at the Speakers' Corner and therefore did 
not require a separate public entertainment licence (Chee 2002). Nev-
ertheless, he was charged with breaking the law of not applying for a 
public entertainment licence and was ﬁned S$3,000, as the judge ruled 
that Chee's speech 'clearly constituted public entertainment as deﬁned 
in the Act' (Reuters, 30 July 2002).
So when Singapore's third prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, an-
nounced during a National Day Rally speech a partial relaxation of the 
rules on the expression of political views in 2004, it was greeted with 
limited enthusiasm. Lee in his speech announced that Singaporeans 
would no longer need police approval to speak at indoor gatherings 
(Agence France Presse, 22 August 2004). Some days later, the Singapore 
police clariﬁed that indoor talks would, from 1 September 2004, no 
longer require licences provided they were held in an enclosed space 
'which is not within the hearing or view of any person who is not at-
tending or participating' in the meeting. They further stipulated that 
only Singapore citizens were allowed to organize and address such 
gatherings; and a Public Entertainment and Meeting licence would 
still be required under the Act if a foreign speaker were involved. In 
addition, the police said that the lecturers and speakers must not deal 
with any matter 'which relates, directly or indirectly, to any religious 
belief or to religion generally' or 'which may cause feelings of enmity, 
hatred, ill-will or hostility between different racial or religious groups 
in Singapore' (Agence France Presse, 27 August 2004). 
Hence, it was no surprise that opposition MP and Workers' Party 
secretary-general Low Thia Khiang criticized these moves as simply 
'opening up within a conﬁned space'; and said that such measures would 
have a limited impact on the rest of society. Low said if the government 
was serious about encouraging diverse views, 'it should have free speech 
venues in all HDB neighbourhood parks' and that 'a mature society can 
and should allow people to discuss such issues and the audience should 
be able to make judgments for themselves'. He added that this relaxa-
tion was being promulgated as 'real change' to convince Singaporeans 
and overseas critics that Singapore was now an open society in which 
democratic rights would be protected by the current prime minister 
(ST, 25 August 2004).
Long-time constitutional expert and academic Kevin Tan had this to 
say about the amendment:
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I think the recent announcement of waiver of permits for indoor meetings 
goes a long way to reduce the impact of the Public Entertainments and 
Meetings Act (PEMA). However, the PEMA still gives the police too much 
power to decide how the right to free speech and assembly are to be exercised 
in Singapore. They have much discretion to decide whether or not to grant 
a permit and to designate where the meeting or speech will take place.6
The waiver of permits does reduce a layer of administration for politi-
cal parties, but the fact that this waiver applies only to indoor venues 
means that these generally remain small or else there is a high cost of 
rental involved for larger indoor venues. Some political parties such as 
the Workers' Party, which held a public consultation exercise with its 
members as speakers in March 2005, did so without any consideration 
to changes in the public-speaking guidelines. But many political com-
mentators remain sceptical as to how far this will affect the freedom of 
expression of opposition politicians and political parties so long as per-
mits for outdoor activities continue to be denied by the police (see Table 
2 for a listing of applications of outdoor activities that were denied).
TABLE 2: Denial of Permits
Name Party Date of Pro-
posed Event
Activity
J. B. Jeyaretnam WP 9 January 1982 Rally in Anson
Low Thia Khi-
ang
WP 1993 Democracy Day dinner in open 
space (i.e. outdoors). 
Chee Soon Juan SDP 12 & 15 August 
1999
Outdoor political rallies to speak 
on 'the need for political open-
ness in Singapore'
Chiam See Tong SPP 20 November 
1999
Political speech at party anni-
versary dinner
J. B. Jeyaretnam Former 
secretary-
general of 
the WP
5 January 2003 Protest march against goods and 
services tax hike
J. B. Jeyaretnam Former 
secretary-
general of 
the WP
17 April 2005 Protest march against casino 
Sources: Agence France Presse (1999) 'Singapore Bars Outspoken Opposition Leader Chee from 
Holding Rallies', 5 August; Agence France Presse (2002) 'Jeyaretnam Slams Police Refusal to Allow 
Protest March', 30 December; Lydgate, Chris (2003) Lee's Law: How Singapore Crushes Dissent; Scribe 
Publications, Australia; Reuters (2005) 'Singapore Rejects Bid for Casino Protest March', 31 March; 
The West Australian (1999) 'Police Stop Party Talk', 22 November. 
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This scepticism was borne out when the Open Singapore Center7 
organized a public meeting on the subject of the death penalty and ran 
into several problems. First, their foreign speaker, Amnesty International 
representative Tim Parritt, was declined a professional visitor's pass by 
the Immigration and Checkpoint Authority. This meant that he was ef-
fectively banned from speaking at the meeting (Singapore Democratic 
Party, 9 May 2005a). Second, during the meeting, a police ofﬁcer in plain 
clothes identiﬁed himself as a policeman and asked for the identity and 
nationality of the moderator. During the forum two uniformed police-
man even entered the room8. Quite clearly the waiver for a licence for 
indoor activities did not mean that the police would cease to monitor 
such activities to check for infringements. The police presence seems to 
be guided by the belief that such activities may infringe other laws. So 
in spite of the 'relaxation', the police continue to monitor and intervene 
in public-speech activities in order to exercise control, thereby diluting 
these so-called measures of liberalization. 
Election Rallies:  
Defamation Laws and Other Regulations 
Although permits have frequently been denied for outdoor political 
meetings, even under the revised PEMA when the police cite law-and-
order issues as pretext, the police do issue special guidelines during 
election time. According to these guidelines, outdoor election rallies or 
meetings for mass direct communication can be held from Nomination 
Day until the eve of Polling Day. They can be held from 7 am until 10 
pm. Lunch-time rallies can only be held between 11.30 am and 2.30 pm. 
In order to hold an election rally or meeting, a permit still needs to be 
obtained. A candidate or an authorized election agent must apply per-
sonally in writing for the permit not later than 2.30 pm one day before 
the rally. Written permission for the use of rally sites is also needed 
from the respective authorities. Such rallies can only be held in sites 
approved by the police. Election meetings can also take place indoors 
but these too require a police permit and the permission of the owner 
of the premises (ST, 20 December 1996). 
But even this limited provision during elections is not without its 
problems. The space allowed political parties during election periods 
has been affected by the use of defamation laws to prosecute political op-
ponents, by both the PAP government and individual PAP politicians.9 
The legislation governing defamation laws comprises the Defamation 
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Act (1957, 1997), which deals with libel, slander and falsehoods. Civil 
libel or slander suits – or the threat of them – have often been used by 
government leaders to intimidate opposition leaders and political op-
ponents. The Penal Code also provides for criminal defamation offences. 
Even the Internal Security Act can be used against someone who speaks 
in a manner likely to incite violence. Other provisions include those that 
rule certain subject matters in speeches as being in contempt of court.
Defamation suits have been used against opposition politicians dur-
ing election rallies, notably in the cases against J. B. Jeyaretnam, Tang 
Liang Hong10 and Chee Soon Juan for allegedly defaming PAP ﬁgures 
in speeches made during election time. The peculiar nature of these 
suits has been highlighted in reports submitted to organizations like 
Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada. These reports have expressed concern 
that 'defamation proceedings against Mr. Jeyaretnam and other govern-
ment critics have impaired the right of Singaporeans to fully engage in 
professions that carry with them the duty or responsibility to, when 
necessary, be critical of government'. One of the observers believed 
that 'there has to be some leeway granted in law to political candidates 
in elections'. This is called the 'defence of qualiﬁed privilege', which 
permits political candidates 'to raise issues of concern to the public' 
(Davidson and Rubin 2001). This means that an opposition politician 
should be entitled to raise issues of concern and that there needs to be 
some response from the government. 
However, in Singapore there is no such defence, and the courts 'will 
presume that the speaker intended to assert the truth of the matter being 
raised', and prosecute accordingly. Speakers thus run the risk of being 
sued for defamation, especially during election time in the cut and thrust 
of political speeches. The defence of qualiﬁed privilege is precluded in 
Section 14 of the Defamation Act, which is designed to severely restrict 
the freedom to discuss 'questions in issue'. Conversely, this section of 
the Act focuses on protecting a plaintiff's reputation rather than protect-
ing fair comments by politicians in any political discussions or debate 
(upon which an election usually depends). In this area, the defamation 
law in Singapore sets itself against the laws in other Commonwealth 
countries (Davidson and Rubin 2001) and makes a 'radical departure 
from its common law roots' (Bryan and Rubin 2004: 1). However, in 
Singapore, it is the case law made by judges that shapes the parameters 
of free speech, not the Act itself. This is very different from the laws 
of the PEMA, which are very restrictive but at least have the beneﬁt of 
being quite clear because they are in statutory form. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 119
______________________________________________________ Restricting Free Speech
PAP government leaders thus use court proceedings and defama-
tion suits against political opponents and critics. Such suits that are 
often decided in favour of PAP plaintiffs have created the perception 
that the ruling party uses the judicial system for political purposes. 
Costly judgments in libel suits do lead to bankruptcy, and under the 
law, bankrupt persons are ineligible to sit in Parliament. This has been 
the fate of the ﬁrst post-independence opposition MP J. B. Jeyaretnam; 
other prominent cases include Tang Liang Hong and Chee Soon Juan. 
It has had a stiﬂing effect on the full expression of political opinion and 
has disadvantaged the political opposition.
One of the early cases of defamation was brought against both an op-
position-connected newspaper and an opposition politician in 1973. The 
Chern Sien Pao was successfully sued by then-prime minister Lee Kuan 
Yew for publishing 'slanderous remarks' made by Barisan Sosialis elec-
toral candidate Harban Singh. Singh himself was jailed for one month 
for 'criminal defamation of the prime minister' (Seow 1998: 130). 
Three years later in 1976, Ho Juan Thai of the Workers' Party (WP) was 
accused by the PAP of making speeches 'inciting the Chinese-speaking 
to violence on the language issue' during the general election. A warrant 
for his arrest was issued under the Internal Security Act, and Ho ﬂed to 
London as soon as the result of the poll was announced. After the elec-
tions in that same year, the then-secretary general of the WP was sued 
for defamation by then-prime minister Lee Kuan Yew for saying during 
an election rally 'that a bank of which his [Lee's] brother was a director 
had been given a banking licence when other companies applying for 
banking licences had not been able to get their licences'. Jeyaretnam 
was found guilty in the High Court, and ordered to pay damages of 
S$130,000, with total costs amounting to S$500,000 (Low et al. 1997).
In the 1980s, an election rally during the 1988 general election was 
the venue at which Jeyaretnam questioned the PAP government's in-
vestigation of the suicide of the minister for national development, Teh 
Cheang Wan. He 'also asked whether the prime minister had replied to 
a letter written to him by Teh'. Lee Kuan Yew commenced a case against 
Jeyaretnam for slander, because 'his words at the election rally were 
understood to mean that Lee had aided and abetted Teh Cheang Wan 
to commit suicide, which was a criminal offence'. Again, Jeyaretnam 
was found guilty and ordered to pay Lee damages of S$260,000 together 
with interest on the amount and costs (Low et al. 1997).  
The 1990s began with more charges against Workers' Party electoral 
candidates. Gopalan Nair was charged with contempt of court 'for mak-
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ing a speech at an election rally in which he was alleged to have cast as-
persions on the system of promotion of judges in the Subordinate Courts'. 
He was found guilty and ﬁned S$8,000 by a judge of the High Court, and 
later ordered to pay S$13,000 to the government for legal costs. 
On the few occasions where permits were issued for a rally in an 
enclosed space (e.g. a football stadium), WP member Wee Han Kim 
apologized publicly to the then-senior minister Lee Kuan Yew and his 
son, then-ﬁrst deputy prime minister Lee Hsien Loong, for making a 
speech at a party Labour Day rally 'implying that the latter had gained 
his pre-eminent public ofﬁce not on his own merits but due to the nepo-
tistic inﬂuence of his father' in mid-1992. Before any writ could be issued, 
Wee agreed to pay damages for defamation of S$100,000 to each of the 
Lees, plus legal costs and other charges amounting to approximately 
S$223,000 (Low et al. 1997). 
In 1997, Tang Liang Hong, formerly of the Workers' Party, was hit by 
13 libel suits from PAP ministers and MPs, including the then-senior 
minister and then-prime minister, when he called them liars after they 
had labelled him an 'anti-Christian, Chinese chauvinist and a danger-
ous man'. Tang left Singapore for Johor, Malaysia after receiving death 
threats. He also faced charges from the Inland Revenue Authority for 
evading taxes. After Tang left, the plaintiffs 'obtained an injunction 
against Tang to restrain him from disposing of his assets and requiring 
him to disclose the whereabouts of all his assets'. The plaintiffs obtained 
default judgments against Tang in all their suits after Tang 'failed to ﬁle 
an afﬁdavit disclosing his assets'. A judge at the High Court assessed 
Tang's incurred damages at S$8,075,000 (Low et al. 1997). 
Related to this case was that of J. B. Jeyaretnam in that same year, 
who faced nine defamation suits by 11 PAP ministers and MPs 'for say-
ing at an election rally that Tang Liang Hong had just handed him two 
police reports made by Tang Liang Hong 'against Goh Chok Tong and 
his people'. The judge at the trial found that Jeyaretnam's words were 
defamatory 'but of a much lesser meaning than that claimed by Goh'. 
The judge awarded Goh 10 per cent of the S$200,000 damages claimed 
by him, and also ordered Jeyaretnam to pay 60 per cent of Goh's costs 
(Low et al. 1997). Jeyaretnam in April 2002 formally apologized to then-
senior minister Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP members for the remarks 
made during the 1997 campaign. In exchange for the apology, the men 
dropped defamation lawsuits against Jeyaretnam and agreed to forgo 
damages (Agence France Presse, 2 April 2002). 
This offer was though of no consequence, as Jeyaretnam had already 
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been declared bankrupt in 2001 and had lost his seat in Parliament. He 
had lost a ﬁnal appeal against the bankruptcy order, which stemmed 
from a lawsuit ﬁled against him by PAP ofﬁcials who claimed that he 
had defamed them in the Workers' Party newspaper the Hammer in 
1995, when Jeyaretnam was its editor. An article there had criticized 
the organizers of a campaign promoting the use of the Tamil language 
(South China Morning Post, 24 July 2001). Accordance to Singapore law, 
bankruptcy disqualiﬁes a person from holding public ofﬁce.
The latest of the election-related defamation suits took place at the 
end of 2001. Then-senior minister Lee Kuan Yew and then-prime min-
TABLE 3: Defamation and Other Criminal Offences during Election 
Campaigns
Name Party Date Charge Nature of Penalty
Harban Singh Barisan 
Sosialis
1973 Criminal defamation of the prime 
minister
Jail – 1 month
Ho Juan Thai Workers' 
Party
1976 Accused by the PAP of making 
speeches inciting the Chinese-
speaking to violence on language 
issue (during elections)
Warrant for arrest issued under the Internal 
Security Act. Ho ﬂed to London as soon as the 
result of the polls was announced, and is still 
residing in the United Kingdom.
J. B. Jeyaret-
nam
Workers' 
Party
1976 Sued for defamation by Lee Kuan 
Yew for things said at general 
election rally 
Damages of S$130,000 awarded to Lee.
J. B. Jeyaret-
nam
Workers' 
Party
1988 Sued for defamation by Lee Kuan 
Yew for things said at general 
election rally 
Damages of S$260,000 awarded to Lee, plus 
interest and costs
Gopalan Nair Workers' 
Party
1991 Contempt of court for casting as-
persions on system of promotion of 
judges in speech at election rally 
Fined S$8,000 and ordered to pay S$13,000 to 
government for legal costs
Wee Han Kim Workers' 
Party
1992 Accused of defaming Lee and Lee 
at Labour Day Rally
Damages paid to plaintiffs plus legal costs and 
advertisement charges totalling S$223,000. 
J. B. Jeyaret-
nam 
Workers' 
Party
1995 Accused of defaming PAP ofﬁcials 
in party newsletter article when he 
was the editor
Damages of S$235,000 awarded to plaintiffs. 
Declared bankrupt and barred from Parlia-
ment after failing to pay the ﬁnal instalment.   
Tang Liang 
Hong
Workers' 
Party
Jan. 
1997
Civil defamation suit - accused of 
defaming PAP members through 
police reports
S$8,000,000 in damages awarded to PAP 
plaintiffs. 
J. B. Jeyaret-
nam
Workers' 
Party
Jan. 
1997
Accused of defaming Goh Chok 
Tong at election rally
Civil defamation suit by Goh and 10 other 
PAP politicians were dropped after Jeyaret-
nam apologized. 
Chee Soon 
Juan
Singapore 
Democrat 
Party
Nov. 
2001
Accused of defaming then- PM 
Goh and then-SM Lee during 2001 
election campaign
Ordered by the High Court to pay a total of 
S$500,000 in damages to Goh and Lee. 
Sources::Agence France Presse (2001) 'Opposition MP Files Appeal against Bankruptcy Order'. 22 
February; Agence France Presse (2002) 'Jeyaretnam Says Sorry, Defamation Charges Dropped'. 
2 April; Low Thia Khiang, Huang Seow Kwang, K. Mariappane and Rahim Osman (1997) The 
Workers' Party 40th Anniversary Magazine; The Workers' Party, Singapore; Mutalib, Hussin (2003) 
Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore, Eastern Universities 
Press, Singapore; ST (2005) 'SDP Chief Could be Declared Bankrupt'. 17 March; Seow, Francis T. 
(1994) To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
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ister Goh Chok Tong sued Chee Soon Juan, leader of the Singapore 
Democratic Party (SDP), for defamation based upon comments Chee had 
made during a campaign stop in the November 2001 general election. 
Chee had allegedly accused them of 'misleading Parliament over an al-
leged S$17 million (US$10 million) loan to former Indonesian President 
Suharto' (Agence France Presse, 6 September 2004; ST, 17 March 2005). 
In March 2005 it was reported that SDP chief Chee Soon Juan 'failed 
to meet a demand by lawyers acting for Mr Goh Chok Tong and Mr 
Lee Kuan Yew that he pay S$500,000 in damages awarded to them by 
the High Court'. The court had ruled in January that Chee had to pay 
S$300,000 to Goh and S$200,000 to Lee for defaming them during the 
2001 election campaign (ST, 17 March 2005). 
In spite of the guarantees of freedom of speech, as laid out in Article 
14 of the Singapore Constitution, opposition ﬁgures have borne the brunt 
of the defamation charges during election rallies. Table 3 provides an 
overview of defamation suits brought against opposition ﬁgures by PAP 
ofﬁcials, mainly arising from speeches made during election rallies. A 
pattern has emerged whereby these suits have become a tool to attack 
opposition leaders and candidates during election times, and the ﬁnes 
have been especially heavy and aimed at bankrupting them.
Policing Speech in Parliament
In the preceding sections we saw how the work of opposition politicians 
and parties ran into difﬁculties because of strict legislation surrounding 
public speaking. What is interesting about the Singapore case is that such 
restrictions in some ways also extend to speech in Parliament. Article 
63 (Privileges of Parliament) of the Singapore Constitution states: 'It 
shall be lawful for the Legislature by law to determine and regulate the 
privileges, immunities or powers of Parliament.' This 'merely allows 
Parliament to regulate its own privileges, immunities and powers' (Tan 
et al. 1991). 
Such privileges and procedures are recorded in the Standing Orders 
of the Parliament of Singapore. The Standing Orders among other things 
offer guidance on how debate is to be conducted in Parliament. For in-
stance, there are clear and distinct time limits for MPs when answering 
questions, when addressing speciﬁc committees of parliament, and for 
proposing motions. In respect to replying to questions, the orders state 
that 'no Member shall be entitled to speak to any question in Parliament 
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for more than 30 minutes, or to address a Committee of the whole Parlia-
ment for more than 15 minutes at any one time'. For motions, the 'mover 
of an original motion shall be entitled to not more than one hour for his 
opening speech and another hour for his reply' (Standing Orders of the 
Parliament of Singapore 2004). Overall the rules about speaking times 
favour a minister more than an ordinary backbencher. The time limits 
indicated in the current Standing Orders are sparse compared to speaking 
times in earlier parliaments. For instance, David Marshall spoke for six 
hours during a debate on constitutional proposals in 1957. In 1961, Lee 
Siew Choh of the Barisan Sosialis spoke for more than seven hours, lasting 
until almost four o'clock the following morning (Chan 2001: 239, 255). 
Like the PEMA and the Defamation Act, these rules apply to all MPs 
of all parties. However, the requirement that at least a certain number of 
MPs are needed to move a motion in the current Standing Orders does 
impact primarily on the opposition MPs, as in the present Parliament 
there are only two elected opposition MPs from two different parties, and 
one NCMP11. When the Standing Orders are amended to either reduce 
the time allowed for a member to speak, or to curtail opportunities for 
speaking, it not only impedes the opposition's ability to communicate 
their constituency's concerns, it also erodes their ability to be effective. 
Parliament is essentially a numbers game. With few opposition politi-
cians from different parties, the total time allocated to them will be cor-
respondingly reduced when time is reduced. The incumbent can still 
spread the time around, especially when they have so many members 
in the Chamber. Further, apart from the rules contained in the Standing 
Orders, how the speaker applies these rules are also important.12 
One key provision within the Standing Orders of the Parliament of 
Singapore relates to the powers and operations of the Committee of 
Privileges. The Committee consists of eight MPs who conduct hearings 
into cases of alleged parliamentary misconduct by other MPs (Standing 
Orders of Parliament of Singapore 2004). The Committee is composed 
of mostly MPs from the ruling PAP, with usually just one opposition 
MP. There has been at least one instance of the use of this committee 
in the history of the Singapore Parliament, namely when it was used 
against MP David Marshall in 1962. Like Jeyaretnam, Marshall was a 
criminal defence lawyer who wanted to raise in Parliament an issue that 
was related to one of his cases. The Committee of Privileges presided 
over this and concluded that because Marshall was a lawyer involved 
in the case, he was not entitled to raise it in Parliament, even in general 
terms (Lydgate 2003: 109).
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When J. B. Jeyaretnam was elected in the Anson by-election, this tool 
was more visibly deployed as a form of disciplinary action against the 
opposition politician. He was referred to the Committee the ﬁrst time in 
1982, and received no punishment after the Speaker accepted his apology 
(Lydgate 2003: 110-14). The second time was in 1986, when the Speaker 
of the House again referred him to the Committee of Privileges for dis-
ciplinary action (Lydgate 2003: 160). Jeyaretnam was accused of making 
an unsubstantiated statement in Parliament concerning a member of the 
public's wrongful arrest, and for 'failing to declare his pecuniary interest 
in a matter raised by him in Parliament' (Low et al. 1997). 
In late 1986, two weeks before Jeyaretnam's hearing by the Commit-
tee, Parliament had rushed through a special amendment increasing the 
punishment of errant MPs. Dishonourable conduct, abuse of privilege 
and contempt were now punishable by a ﬁne of up to S$50,000, from a 
previous maximum of S$1,000. Members could also be stripped of their 
privileges and be liable to face civil lawsuits. The new penalties were not 
retroactive, but they would apply to anything Jeyaretnam said during the 
hearing (Lydgate 2003: 169-70). Although MPs were usually protected by 
law from defamation in Parliament, in practice, however, the nature of 
his questioning during the Committee hearing indicated that this protec-
tion was being retroactively stripped away (Lydgate 2003: 172). In other 
words, what Jeyaretnam said before the amendment would not be taken 
into account, but what he was to say henceforth was to be governed by 
this new ruling. By December that year Jeyaretnam had been ﬁned a few 
more times after being referred to the Committee of Privileges for more 
offences related to alleged misconduct regarding parliamentary issues. 
These ﬁnes added up to a substantial amount (Low et al. 1997).
A second such incident occurred nine years later in November 1996, 
when the committee found four members of the Singapore Democratic 
Party (SDP) 'guilty of contempt of Parliament'. The four, including the 
SDP secretary-general Chee Soon Juan, were 'found guilty of perjury, wil-
fully giving false answers, prevaricating and misconducting themselves 
as witnesses' over data on healthcare (ST, 12 December 1996). Earlier 
that year, the SDP had stated in a report that the government's share of 
healthcare spending had dropped from 27 per cent in 1989 to 5 per cent in 
1990. They reiterated this claim during a Select Committee hearing in July 
1996, but later said this was a typing error and that the number should be 
25 per cent instead of 5 per cent. Charges were ﬁled by the health minister 
against four members of the SDP, and they were summoned to appear 
before the Committee of Privileges (ST, 26 October 1996). 
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The four were SDP secretary-general Chee Soon Juan, Wong Hong 
Toy, S. Kunalen and Kwan Yue Keng. Charges against them included 
'perjury, prevarication, misconduct and wilfully giving false evidence' 
before the Health Select Committee convened earlier that year. During 
the 12-hour session with the Committee of Privileges, Chee said that 
'he was only human and so had made errors in a report the party had 
presented to the Select Committee' (ST, 1 November 1996). They were 
variously ﬁned between S$5,000 and S$25,000 each, but as Parliament 
was not a court of law, 'the ﬁnes do not bar the SDP members from 
contesting in the coming General Election [of 1997]' (ST, 23 November 
1996). Low Thia Khiang, the only opposition MP in the Committee of 
Privileges, tried unsuccessfully to reduce the ﬁnes recommended for 
the SDP members (ST, 24 November 1996). 
This shows that even if an opposition politician wins a seat in Parlia-
ment or is involved in any proceedings initiated under the authority of 
Parliament, he or she runs the risk of breaching 'privileges' and could 
suffer punitive actions.
The Impact of Free Speech Restrictions  
on Opposition Parties 
The presence of several layers of rules that govern free speech inﬂuences 
the ways in which free speech is perceived and executed by opposition 
parties in Singapore. It also affects how free-speech activities are de-
ployed, or whether they are deployed in the ﬁrst place.
For instance, it is not uncommon to hear members of opposition par-
ties who insist that there is actually free speech in Singapore as long 
as one seeks to exercise free-speech activities within the framework of 
current rules, although they acknowledge that there is a certain layer 
of administration that exists for obtaining licences and permits. With 
announcements made by Lee Hsien Loong in 2004, at least one layer 
of administration has been removed. However there is agreement that 
outdoor political speeches are not free, nor are the rules fair. 
But such interpretations also lead to other issues regarding the type 
or quality of opposition politicians. Some opposition politicians are 
viewed as moderate, e.g. Chiam See Tong and Low Thia Khiang, whose 
existence in the parliamentary system is often cited by the ruling party 
to underscore the legitimacy of the political system under its rule (ST, 
12 October 2005; see also conclusion). On the other hand, opposition 
politicians such J. B. Jeyaretnam or Chee Soon Juan are often berated 
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because they are more robust in their criticism of the ruling PAP, espe-
cially when it comes to free speech.
Another factor that affects free speech is the impact of defamation 
laws. Some writers have observed that defamation laws create a climate 
of fear, which frequently results in self-censorship of speech (Lydgate 
2003; Davidson and Rubin 2001). This forces opposition politicians to be 
ultra-careful with regard to what they say in public. At the party level, 
this slows down decision-making about engaging in public-free speech 
activities such as rallies and forums13. It may even limit the number of 
free-speech activities that opposition parties are willing to undertake. 
On the other hand, some argue that the indirect consequences of such 
defamation laws may be positive: that they may improve opposition 
communications and make opposition politicians more responsible for 
what they say.14. For instance, more strenuous efforts will be made to 
verify facts and ﬁgures before making statements on political matters. 
However, there remains the concern that not only does the Defamation 
Act restrict free speech, for example through self-censorship, but that 
even if opposition politicians exercise caution, they may infringe the 
law through some obscure technicality. 
In real terms, the political value of free speech for opposition parties is 
limited. Many commentators argue that how Singaporeans view the oppo-
sition depends on how the media reports on the opposition.15 Free-speech 
activities such as forums and rallies, and the content of what is said dur-
ing those activities, can only have limited impact if the media, especially 
the local media, choose not to report it. Thus, the wider dissemination of 
content is kept in check, either by the non-reportage or sometimes negative 
reporting of such activities by the media. The mainstream local media, by 
nature largely pro-PAP, sometimes ignore and even distort opposition 
parties' viewpoints. Although there has been some dissemination of such 
information by international NGOs and Media Watch organizations, their 
reach has been limited given the fact that such international NGOs do 
not have an effective local partner (Gomez 2005).
Civil Disobedience as an Option
The various obstructions to freedom of expression, electoral fairness and 
the impact of other laws have led opposition politicians like Chee Soon 
Juan to advocate the concept of non-violent civil disobedience as being 
the only avenue left, given that the parliamentary process is not viable 
because of the PAP's dominance. Chee has said that he 'sees non-violent 
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civil disobedience and protest as a viable long-term strategy to change 
the present system in Singapore' (ST, 10 July 2005). 
When there are criticisms of Singapore's laws from opposition politi-
cians like Chee, spokespersons from the PAP government have a number 
of stock responses. One example goes like this: 'If any Singaporean 
disagrees with our tough laws … the proper and democratic way to 
proceed is to contest and win an election, and press to change the law in 
Parliament' (ST, 27 November 2005). Alternatively, they will point out 
that there are 'established avenues for reviewing and changing' unjust 
laws, and that other opposition MPs (such as Chiam See Tong and Low 
Thia Khiang) did not have to resort to civil disobedience in order to get 
themselves elected (ST, 12 October 2005). 
However, the laws governing Singapore's electoral process are them-
selves biased in favour of the ruling PAP, and are aimed at making 
opposition parties 'ineffectual and unable to challenge the PAP' (Chee 
2005: 45) by creating a  playing ﬁeld that is far from level. It is these 
uncertainties and a sense that nothing will change that prompted op-
position politician Chee Soon Juan to cite civil disobedience as the only 
option left to change the laws. Chee Soon Juan's acts of civil disobedience 
since 1998 are based on this belief and have sought to highlight how 
these laws disadvantage and are selectively used against the opposition 
(Singapore Democratic Party, 28 June 2005b).
Chee has ofﬁcially mounted a civil disobedience campaign, beginning 
with ﬂouting public speaking rules, refusing to pay ﬁnes and going to 
prison (ST, 10 October 2005). His actions have drawn attention to laws 
like licensing rules for public events, and were instrumental in lead-
ing to some limited liberalization by the government, for example in 
establishing a Speakers' Corner and a relaxation of the licensing rules 
for indoor talks (George 2005: 23). 
Even with limited liberalization, there are other levels of monitor-
ing and controls that prevent full implementation of these laws. An 
incident illustrating this took place on 9 July 2005, during the launch of 
Chee Soon Juan's new book on civil disobedience The Power of Courage 
at a local hotel. Plain-clothes policemen seized a video disc which had 
been playing a ﬁlm in the background while Chee was autographing his 
book. The police ofﬁcers stated that they were seizing the disc because 
it did not have a certiﬁcate for public exhibition, an offence under the 
Films Act. The police ofﬁcers were caught on ﬁlm recording the entire 
book launch with a video camera, and the incident was reported on the 
Singapore Democratic Party's website (Singapore Democratic Party, 
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9 July 2005c). This shows that in spite of ofﬁcial liberalization of the 
laws, in practice the activities of certain opposition politicians are still 
being closely watched and have come up against the repressive tools of 
authority. This means that freedom of expression requires considerable 
freedom of movement, assembly and association in order to render po-
litical expression meaningful. This is certainly not the case in Singapore 
under the ruling PAP government.
Chee's promotion of civil disobedience activities using methods of 
non-violence as an opposition strategy (ST, 10 October 2005) is an at-
tempt to effect change in Singapore. However, the PAP government 
has begun to counter the strategy by emphasizing that political change 
must be brought about through 'constitutional and lawful means', and 
that 'Singaporeans are free to express themselves politically within the 
law' (ST, 17 September 2005). It is too early to tell if civil disobedience 
can make a dent in Singapore's free-speech laws. But the pressure from 
such civil disobedience acts has certainly been felt by the Singapore 
political system. 
Conclusion
The nature of restrictions surrounding free speech in Singapore serves 
to keep opposition parties weak since they are not able to robustly 
challenge the ruling party. This keeps competition between political 
parties at a very low level, with the opposition being unable to change 
the present rules and regulations. This situation relegates Singaporean 
democracy to an existence in name, but not in substance. 
James Gomez is a PhD Candidate at the Monash Asia Institute, Monash 
University, Australia.
NOTES
1  The Public Entertainment Licensing Unit (PELU), a sub-unit of the Singapore Po-
lice Force issues and regulates permits for public entertainment (ST, 18 November 
2000). 
2  In 1988 the town councils were established and took over some of the roles from the 
public utility services.
3  Email response from Steve Chia, Non-Constituency MP, National Solidarity Party, 
7 June 2005.
4  Email response from Yaw Shin Leong, former executive committee member, Work-
ers' Party, and former Hougang town councillor, 7 June 2005.
5  The Think Centre was founded in 1999 as a sole proprietorship which organized 
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events and published books on topics of politics and human rights. In 2001 it 
registered as a society and continued to organize activities around human rights 
themes.
6  Email response from Kevin Tan, Singapore constitutional law expert and academic, 
20 May 2005.
7  A civil society organization co-founded by opposition ﬁgures J. B. Jeyaretnam and 
Chee Soon Juan. 
8  Interview with Chee Soon Juan, secretary-general, Singapore Democratic Party on 
18 April 2005 in Singapore.
9  The use of defamation is not restricted to speech during election rallies. Defama-
tion laws have been used against opposition politicians during non-election-related 
activities as well as against content contained in party publications. 
10  Tang Liang Hong was a Workers' Party candidate for the Cheng San GRC during 
the 1997 general elections. After the elections, he was sued for defamation by the 
then prime minister Goh Chok Tong, then senior minister Lee Kuan Yew, and nine 
other current or former MPs. Most of the lawsuits arose from responses Tang had 
made to the PAP leaders' claim, that he was an 'anti-Christian, anti-English-educated, 
Chinese-language chauvinist'. Immediately after the election, Tang ﬂed Singapore, 
citing death threats. In May the Singapore High Court ordered him to pay the PAP 
leaders S$8.08 million in damages.
11  The Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) scheme was introduced in 
1984, just before that year's elections. Under this scheme, the top three opposition 
candidates in a general election with the highest percentage of losing votes would 
be allowed into Parliament. NCMPs have limited voting powers and play no role 
in the running of town councils. The introduction of the NCMPs was to provide for 
some form of opposition in Parliament, even if none was directly elected.
12  Email response from Low Thia Khiang, Workers' Party Member of Parliament, 20 
May 2005.
13  Email response from Melvin Tan, Workers' Party Central Executive Committee 
member, 30 May 2005.
14  Email response from Low Thia Khiang, Workers' Party Member of Parliament, 20 
May 2005.
15  Email response from Tan Chong Kee, founder of Sintercom and member of now 
defunct Singapore Mediawatch Community Initiative, 16 May 2005.
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